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1. Introduction 
Even aside from the individual income tax, the central government of 
Colombia imposes a variety of taxes on the wages of workers.  Some of these 
taxes are more properly viewed as “contributions” because individuals are entitled 
to benefits, the size of which varies with their contributions.   Some may also be 
seen as a way to force people to save for old age or for insurance against health 
problems and occupational injury.  Several have all the features of a tax, but 
nevertheless do not go into the general revenues of the government and instead 
are used to finance government and non-government provision of training 
programs and social services.  In total, these various payroll taxes constitute a 
significant additional burden on labor, a burden that many believe has had a 
substantial range of effects on such things as employment and unemployment.  
Because of this additional burden, many also believe that these payroll taxes are 
escaped via evasion and avoidance in significant amounts, in part by switching 
labor from the formal to the informal sectors of the Colombian economy, by 
switching compensation from taxed to untaxed forms, and by outright evasion. 
This paper analyzes all of these payroll taxes, but focuses especially on 
what is called the parafiscales.  The parafiscales are defined by Article 2 of Law 
225 (1995) as “mandatory taxes established by law, which affect a certain and 
unique social or economic group and are used for the benefit of that same sector”.  
These quasi-fiscal contributions are imposed on the payrolls of employers, and are 
used to finance the Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (the Colombian 
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Institute for Family Welfare, or ICBF), the Servico Nacional de Aprendizaje (the 
National Training Service, or SENA), and the Cajas de Compensación.  In total, 
collections from these parafiscales are substantial, amounting to over 1 percent of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  Several other of the major payroll taxes are 
briefly discussed, largely in order to give a more complete picture of the total 
amount by which the cost of labor is increased by these charges.  These additional 
programs include apprenticeship programs (or the “Learning Quota”) and social 
security contributions for health, pensions, and professional risks.1 
The next section describes the Colombian labor market during the last 
decade, emphasizing the dramatic increase in unemployment over this period and 
discussing some possible reasons for this increase.  The structural features of the 
main payroll taxes are then discussed, followed by an analysis of their likely 
effects.  The final section presents some conclusions. 
 
2. The Labor Market Situation in Colombia in the 1990s2 
The Colombian economy experienced strong economic growth through 
the first half of the 1990s, with real GDP growth rates in excess of 5 percent in 
1993, 1994, and 1995.  During this time, the unemployment rate generally but 
somewhat erratically fell, and reached its lowest level in 1994, at around 7 percent 
(Figure 1).  However, during the last 5 years of the decade economic growth 
slowed significantly.  In 1999 real GDP rose by only 0.5 percent, and in 1999 the 
economy experienced its worst recession since the 1930s when real GDP fell by 
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4.3 percent.  By the end of the decade, the unemployment rate in some urban 
areas exceeded 20 percent, and the national unemployment rate was around 17 
percent. 
The poor economic performance of the Colombian economy during the 
latter half of the 1990s is at least partly responsible for the increase in 
unemployment during this period.  However, there is some evidence that the 
recession is not the only explanation (International Monetary Fund, 2001).  Even 
during the economic boom of the early 1990s unemployment did not fall 
appreciably.  Further, unemployment increased significantly even before the 
economic collapse of 1998 and 1999, and, in addition, the economic recovery that 
occurred in 2000 had little impact on the rate of unemployment.  These 
considerations point to other, more structural aspects of labor markets as 
contributing factors to the high and stubborn rate of unemployment. 
These structural aspects are difficult to identify, but likely include several 
factors as identified by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadistica 
(DANE).  For example, although unemployment rates increased significantly 
even for those with higher education and also among heads of families, 
unemployment tended to be highest among those with low levels of education 
between 15 and 30 years of age.3  Perhaps related to the increased unemployment 
rate of heads of families, the overall labor force participation rate in 2000 was 6 
percentage points higher than in 1995 (Figure 2).  Also, real labor costs (inclusive 
of all payroll taxes) generally rose during the 1990s, and did not decline until 
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2000 (Figure 3).  Among contributing factors, the real minimum wage has 
increased by 8 percent since 1998, after a decade of little trend.  Overall, the price 
of labor relative to capital more than doubled over the decade, despite the high 
and increasing levels of unemployment.  Other factors for the high and increasing 
levels of unemployment include the continuing guerrilla war in Colombia and the 
economic struggles of neighboring countries. 
Finally, and related to the increase in the price of labor, there were 
significant changes during the 1990s in the ways that labor was taxed, especially 
in the various payroll taxes imposed upon labor.  It is this factor that is examined 
next. 
 
3. The Major Taxes on Payrolls and their Administration 
There are many taxes imposed on roughly the same base, the wage bill or 
payrolls of firms.  These major taxes here include contributions for social 
security, an apprenticeship charge (or the Learning Quota), and the parafiscales; 
the latter are used to finance SENA, ICBF and the Cajas de Compensación.  Some 
of the main features of these taxes are shown in Table 1.  In particular, it is 
important to note that several of these taxes (e.g., those for social security) entitle 
the individual to benefits, the magnitude of which is tied somewhat to the level of 
contributions.  However, the parafiscales do not have any individual-specific 
benefits linked to their payment, and instead finance programs that benefit a 
specific social or economic group.  Overall, the parafiscales have the same 
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mandatory characteristics of taxes, but they are not are incorporated in the public 
treasury.  Each of these taxes is discussed in detail in López-Castaño (2002).4 
In total, social security contributions were about 7 percent of GDP in 
2000, an amount that represents a significant tax burden.  The parafiscales 
themselves accounted for another 1.2 percent of GDP in 2000.  It is important to 
note that the level of all of these taxes, including the additional taxes on payrolls 
represented by the parafiscales, is generally quite high in Colombia.  Table 2 
shows the rates of taxation in selected Latin American countries, as documented 
in the International Bulletin of Fiscal Documentation; Table 3 gives similar 
information for OECD countries. 
This section discusses the major features of the parafiscales. 
 
3.1. Cajas de Compensación 
The Cajas de Compensación were created at the end of the fifties by 
entrepreneurs and workers with the objective of reducing the economic burden of 
the poorest workers, through monetary subsidies and in-kind services.  In 1957, 
through Extraordinary Decree Number 118 the family subsidy was introduced as 
an obligation for every firm with more than 20 employees, with the Cajas de 
Compensación designated as the organization that would redistribute the 
resources collected for family subsidies; currently, all firms are required to 
contribute to the Cajas.  In 1980 firms affiliated with the Cajas totaled 67 
thousand, with 1.3 million affiliated workers; the 4 percent tax on payroll 
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represented 0.38 percent of GDP.  There are currently 55 separate funds, 
operating in all departments in Colombia.  In total, roughly 171,000 formal sector 
companies, with 3.3 million affiliated employees, pay 4 percent of their payroll to 
the Cajas de Compensación, and nearly 10 million people (nearly one-quarter of 
the total population of Colombia) receive or are eligible to receive benefits. 
There are many and diverse organizations operating under the Cajas de 
Compensación umbrella.  The funds were first conceived in 1948 and then 
formally established in 1957.  In 1982 Law 21 dictated that the Cajas de 
Compensación were to be private, non-profit entities of private law, organized as 
corporations and supervised by the Superintendencia de Subsidio Familiar.  The 
main function of the Cajas is to redistribute a portion of the payroll of the covered 
work force for the benefit of those workers affiliated with the specific caja who 
receive the lowest salaries (e.g., less than four times the minimum wage); in fact, 
the original intention of these funds was to collect contributions and to distribute 
them to the working beneficiaries.  Over the years additional activities and 
programs have been added.  Today the funds provide education, recreation, 
culture, tourism, health, and childhood programs, among many other things. 
The distribution of the affiliated workers and the contributions between 
the different funds is varied. The three largest funds – Colsubsidio, Comfama, and 
Cafam – encompass 35 percent of the affiliated workers and collect 37 percent of 
the total contributions.  There is also a group of 7 medium-sized funds, with 30 
percent of the affiliated workers and 30 percent of the contributions.  The 45 
 10
remaining funds cover 35 percent of the workers and collect 33 percent of the 
contributions.  This distribution of employees and contributions largely reflects 
the regional concentration of the economic activity and the norms that regulate its 
activity at departmental level.  For example, the 10 funds that operate in 
Cundinamarca, Bogota, and Boyacá have over one-fourth of the companies, two-
fifths of the affiliated workers, and also two-fifths of the contributions; in 
contrast, the three funds in Antioquia have 15 percent of the companies, 16 
percent of the workers, and 16 percent of the total contributions. 
By economic activity, commerce and industry jointly covered 32 per cent 
of the workers and 41 per cent of the affiliated companies in 2000.  Firms in 
community services have 32 per cent of the companies and 47 per cent of the 
workers; within this sector are subsectors covering education (8 per cent of the 
workers), health (12 per cent), and real estate activity (11 per cent).  Nearly 95 per 
cent of the companies and 80 per cent of the affiliated workers belong to the 
private sector, with the remaining companies and workers in the public and mixed 
sectors.  Indeed, one rationale for the formation of the Cajas was to extend to 
private sector workers the benefits that public sector workers were already 
receiving. 
The funds provide several types of services to their beneficiaries.  The 
division of the total contributions between these services is proscribed by law, and 
differs by the type of fund according to the fund’s cuociente.  The cuociente is a 
ratio that equals the total annual contributions received by a fund and divides it by 
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the annual average number of beneficiaries.  The funds are classified according to 
the size of their cuociente, and funds within different classifications are required 
by law to spend specified percentages of the contributions on the different types 
of services.5  The 2000 distribution of these allocations across functions is shown 
in Table 5.  The percent of urban workers who receive some form of benefit from 
these programs (in 1997) is given in Table 6.  It is apparent that many urban 
workers, especially in the lower deciles of the income distribution, do not receive 
a subsidy.  Instead, the bulk of the benefits are paid to higher income urban 
workers, which is to be expected given that higher income individuals in urban 
areas are more likely to work in firms that are members of the Cajas. 
The most basic service is the provision of a monetary subsidy to low-
income workers.  The monetary subsidy is paid to workers (and their family 
members) with income less than 4 times the minimum wage.  Nearly 53 per cent 
of the workers who are affiliated employees benefit from this subsidy, or 
1,760,000 workers in 2000.  The amount ranges between P7000 and P21,600 per 
beneficiary, depending on the financial capacity of the specific caja.  In total, over 
P385 million was paid in 2000, and nearly P438 million was paid in 2001. 
Each fund is also required to spend specified percentages of its 
contributions on social housing and health, as well as on various administrative 
functions (e.g., fund management, legal reserves, payment to the 
Superintendencia de Subsidio Familiar).  Any remaining amounts can be used by 
the fund in a number of additional areas, as determined by the fund’s board of 
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directors: education, recreation and sports, hotels, travel agencies, theaters, 
groceries, loans, special education for children, clinics, services for the elderly, 
and so on.  For example, in 2000 there were 80 supermarkets, 44 warehouses, 80 
drug stores, and 41 other facilities of various types (e.g., cafeterias, optical firms), 
totaling 460 units.  It should be noted that some of these additional services are 
funded by the revenues of the commercial activity itself, and not by the 
parafiscales tax itself.  In 2000 only one-third of the activities of the 55 cajas was 
financed with the 4 percent payroll tax.  Although the funds enjoy considerable 
latitude in the provision of these other services, several rules must be followed, 
largely of an administrative nature. 
In total, the Cajas de Compensación employ over 43,000 employees 
(31,456 permanent employees).  The system has total assets of P34 trillion; the 10 
largest funds control 75 per cent of the assets, and Cafam itself has 23 per cent of 
the total assets.  
Several aspects of these services require emphasis.  First, the major 
categories of fund expenditures are the monetary subsidy and social service 
delivery.  Nevertheless, many of the activities of the funds compete directly with 
private sector firms, such as travel agencies, grocery stores, hotels, and recreation 
centers.  Second, according to ASOCAJAS, an association of many of the major 
funds, there are no studies that evaluate the cost effectiveness of the Cajas service 
delivery.  Although the Cajas de Compensación must report their activities to the 
Superintendencia de Subsidio Familiar, the Superintendencia is mainly 
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responsible for ensuring that the fund spends its contributions in accordance with 
legal requirements.  The Superintendencia itself does not do any formal 
evaluations of cost effectiveness, and there are no other organizations that 
evaluate these services.  Third, there is little direct supervision of the cajas.  The 
Superintendencia does not monitor expenditures, and simply ensures that the caja 
spends its contributions in accordance with legal requirements. 
With some exceptions, all firms with at least one permanent worker are 
required to collect the 4 percent tax for the Cajas de Compensación on the payroll 
of their entire labor force; exceptions include transitory workers (or those for 
whom employment does not exceed a month) and workers engaged in certain 
exempted lines of employment.  The tax base is the same one used for social 
security (e.g., the annual basic wage excluding payments for transportation).  For 
administrative reasons, the collection of all three of the parafiscales taxes is 
centralized in the funds specified in the Cajas de Compensación.  Each firm 
collects the entire 9 percent parafiscales tax, and transmits these collections to a 
bank account in the name of its designated fund; this Cajas then retains the 4 
percent tax on total wages for the family subsidy system managed by the Cajas, 
and redistributes the 2 percent tax to the national training service (SENA) and the 
3 percent tax to the Colombian Institute for Family Welfare (ICBF).  Note that 
Law 344 of 1994 specified that any bonuses or extralegal payments agreed 
between employer and employee are not to be considered as salaries and therefore 
do not enter into the base for the computation of parafiscales contributions; there 
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is some speculation that this change has led to a decline in parafiscales 
contributions.  In addition, the growing use of contracts with honoraria or fees, 
which are exempt from parafiscales contributions, has also contributed to such 
deterioration, as has outright evasion of the parafiscales contributions. 
 
3.2. Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (the Colombian Institute for 
Family Welfare, or ICBF) 
The Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar is a decentralized public 
establishment created in 1968 with the aim of providing protection to children and 
improving the welfare of the Colombian families (Article 53 of Law 75 of 1968).  
For financing the Institute, Law 27 of 1974 created a 2 percent contribution on the 
monthly payroll of private and public entities.  With Law 89 of 1988, this 
contribution was increased by one point, to 3 percent of monthly payroll, the rate 
that is currently in force (Ayala et al., 2001).  More generally, the broad legal 
framework for the provision of family services is Decree 2388 of Law 7 of 1979, 
which constituted the Systeme National de Bienestar Familiar (the National 
Family Welfare System, or SNBF), the Ministry of Health, the ICBF, the family 
compensation funds, departments and municipalities, and various other public and 
private institutions to provide family services, as coordinated by the ICBF.  The 
activities of ICBF are financed by a 3 percent tax on payrolls of firms. 
There are several major programs of the ICBF: 
• daycare programs 
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• food programs for pregnant women 
• school food programs 
• aid to abandoned, abused, or at-risk children. 
The daycare programs are provided in the homes of women selected and trained 
by the ICBF, typically in urban areas (or Hogares comunitarios de bienestar).  
Participating daycare providers receive P150,000 per month (or 50 percent of the 
minimum wage) plus food for their families.  These programs provide food and 
basic household needs for the children.  In 2002, over 800,000 children received 
daycare in the program.  Roughly half (48 percent) of participating mothers are 
actually unemployed; they place their children in the daycare programs largely for 
the food that is provided to the children.  Families are required to pay a monthly 
charge that starts at P2000 per month and rises with income. 
The programs for pregnant women provide food to the lactating mother 
and her children.  In 2002 nearly 240,000 children participated; estimates are that 
another roughly 400,000 pregnant women also participated in the program.  The 
school food programs provided breakfast and/or lunch to over 2.3 million children 
in 2002. 
The final main program is aid to abandoned, abused, or at-risk children.  
Also included here are programs that provide assistance to children with physical 
or mental limitations, adoption programs, and programs that deal with family 
counseling and conflict resolution. 
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The ICBF reports a potential target population of 8,174,520 people for 
year 2001 for all of its programs of prevention. Of this total target population, 55 
per cent are between 7 and 18 years old, mainly students; the remaining 45 per 
cent correspond to children between 0 and 7 years, including developed and 
suckling babies.  The ICBF estimates that it serves 92 percent of the developed 
and suckling babies target population, 40 percent of all other children in the 0 to 7 
years old population, and 49 percent of the 7 to 18 years old population.  Overall, 
the ICBF believes that it is covering 50 percent of the target population (Morales, 
2002).  In total, there are over 5000 employees in the ICBF, located in 33 regional 
and 200 local ICBF offices. 
It should be noted that there are few systematic evaluations of the cost 
effectiveness of ICBF programs, including the targeting of its programs, the 
quality of service provision, or the performance of the community daycare 
providers (Perotti, 2000).  Studies that have been performed show no increase in 
the labor supply of women who participate in the daycare programs; others 
suggest that no more than half of the food targeted to children actually goes to the 
children, with the rest going to other family members.  The National Department 
of Planning (2002) estimates that the cost per user in the ICBF could be reduced 
from its current level of P280,000 pesos to 230,000, with no appreciable impact 
on the quality of service provision. 
 
3.3. Servico Nacional de Aprendizaje (the National Training Service, or SENA) 
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The Servico Nacional de Aprendizaje is a public institution under the 
supervision of the Ministerio de Trabajo (or the Ministry of Work).  Its main 
function is to invest in social and technical development of the workers through 
various training programs of integral professional formation. For its financing, 
Decree 1042 of 1978 and Law 21 of 1982 established a 2 percent contribution on 
the monthly value of payroll of the productive sector, and a 0.5 percent tax on 
payroll for the public sector.6 
SENA offers various training programs that are financed with the payroll 
tax of 2 percent.  These programs fall into four main areas: 
• professional training in short and long courses, especially for 
younger workers and for displaced workers 
• enterprise development (e.g., diagnostic analysis of firm 
organizational problems) 
• information systems (e.g., job placement information for workers, 
employment orientation programs for firms, general studies of 
unemployment and labor market patterns) 
• assistance to firms for technological development, such as business 
“incubators”, technology centers, and quality insurance 
monitoring. 
The major program is for professional training.  Here, SENA has traditionally 
concentrated on providing training via “short courses” (e.g., those between 50 and 
400 hours of training) and “long courses” (e.g., those lasting from 1 year or 
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more).  Both types of courses are typically offered with no fee for participants.  
The short courses are directed mainly to technical skill development in such 
narrow areas as motor repair or hotel services.  Most of these courses are offered 
in SENA facilities, although some of these short courses are provided in the firms 
rather than in SENA facilities.  The short courses typically lead to a certificate 
that indicates completion of the course.  The long courses have received 
increasing funding in recent years, in part because studies that indicate a greater 
social return for this type of training (Jimenez, Kugler, and Horn, 1986).  In 1998 
SENA enrolled about 97,000 students in long courses, with 53,000 in programs of 
qualified workers and 44,000 in technical and technological programs at the 
postsecondary level.  In total, there were over 700,000 trainees in SENA facilities 
in 2002. 
According to SENA officials and SENA annual reports, the total budget of 
SENA in 2002 exceeded P300 million, of which roughly 20 percent paid for 
purely administrative costs.  Also, 55 percent of the budget went to professional 
training programs, 10 percent to enterprise development programs, 7 percent for 
information systems programs, and 6 percent for technological development 
programs.  SENA capital expenditures were P5.2 million in 2002. 
There are 7000 permanent SENA employees, most of whom are 
unionized, and another 5000 temporary or contract employees.  According to 
SENA officials, the average pay of SENA instructors is generally higher than 
comparable private sector instructors. 
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As with the other parafiscales programs, it is important to note that there 
are few formal evaluations of the quality of the training programs or of the 
outcome of these programs, including no long-term tracking of SENA graduates.  
The evaluations that have been done indicate that SENA training does not 
increase the probability of employment; in fact, a study by SENA (1999) 
indicated that the unemployment rate among its graduates was substantially 
higher than the national average (19 percent versus 15 percent).  Also, according 
to a study done by the National Planning Agency, the costs of training in SENA 
are typically 25 percent higher than comparable private sector training (19 per 
cent versus 15 per cent), and in the long courses the costs by student/semester 
were greater than the national averages for similar programs.  The limited 
evidence on its distributional impact suggests the SENA training is used more 
heavily by higher income quintiles, according to attendance information.  Perhaps 
because of these findings, the International Labor Office (2000) concluded that: 
“With annual income in excess of US$350 millions, 8,500 civil 
employees, 111 training centers, one of the highest rates of taxation of 
wages (2 per cent) in Latin America, and a cost per hour of instruction 
(US$41 per hour) among the most elevated of the continent, SENA has 
been the object of critics and discussions from the beginning of the 
1990s.... In summary [SENA suffers from] a problem of existence, quality, 
costs, and excessive centralization of the discussions with respect to what 
type of qualification is required and for whom.  This indicates the 
necessity of a reform.” 
 
3.4. Apprenticeship Programs 
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Although the central focus of this paper is on the parafiscales, it is worth 
discussing several other payroll taxes.  One of these is the apprenticeship program 
(or Learning Quota), sometimes considered a parafiscales tax.  Like SENA, the 
apprenticeship program is designed to address labor force training needs by 
financing a trainee’s living expenses and giving the individual training in a 
specific field of practice. 
The program was established by Decree 2838 of 1960 (Article 1), 
subsequently amended by Decree 2375 of 1974 (Article 6).  All employers 
(except those in the construction sector) with capital above P100,000) or with 20 
or more permanent workers are required to hire as apprentices a number of 
workers that is at least 5 percent of their total permanent workforce.  The 
apprenticeship program therefore amounts to an effective tax of 5 percent on the 
payroll of firms.7 
The training can occur at the company itself, at SENA, or at an authorized 
training organization.  Individuals eligible for training must be at least 14 years 
old and must have completed primary education or have equivalent knowledge; 
the training period cannot exceed 3 years.  After the training period, the company 
is not obligated to hire the apprentice.  Decree 2375 of 1994 (Article 7) fixes the 
pay of the apprentice; initially, payment is 50 percent of the legal minimum wage 
for the same job, and is then increased up to 100 percent (including benefits) in 
the last stage of training. 
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SENA’s National Board of Directors determines the specific jobs within a 
company, regulates each company’s quota, and pre-selects the apprentices (with 
final approval by the company).  The Board also has sanctioning power.  
Employers that do not fulfill their trainee quota are subject to monthly fines 
equivalent to 75 or 80 percent of the monthly legal minimum wage for each 
trainee not hired. 
 
3.5. Social Security 
Social security programs are also financed by taxes on payroll.  All 
employers and their employees are required to contribute for health, pensions, and 
occupational risks (or worker’s compensation).8  Employers contribute 8 percent 
of the employee’s wage for health, 10.125 percent for pensions, and 2.0 percent 
for occupational risks; the corresponding employee contribution rates are 4 
percent, 3.375 percent, and 0 percent.  The total employer (employee) 
contribution rate is 20.125 (7.375) percent. 
These payments fund a variety of employee benefits.  In health, 
individuals and their families receive general health care, including surgical, 
maternity, and prescription benefits; there is a separate regime that provides 
subsidized health care for the poor.  For pensions, Law 100 (1993) established a 
dual system.  Individuals may elect to participate in a defined benefit system 
administered by the Instituto de Seguro Socia” (or ISS); alternatively, they may 
designate that their and their employer’s contribution be paid into a specific 
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private pension fund for which pension benefits depend upon fund performance.  
In the ISS plan, workers receive benefits at age 55 for women and at 60 for men; 
in the private plan, the pension begins at age 57 (women) and 62 (men).  For the 
most part, older workers have opted for the ISS plan, and younger workers have 
chosen the private plan.  Worker’s compensation is designed to “prevent, protect, 
and attend workers from the effects of diseases and accidents that they may suffer 
as a consequence of the job they carry out” (Decree 1295 of 1994).  Any covered 
worked who experiences a work-related accident or illness may receive medical, 
surgical, therapeutical, and prescription benefits until complete recovery; the 
individual may also receive compensation for lost wages, including indemnity for 
temporary or permanent incapacity. 
There were significant reforms to these programs in 1993, when the dual 
pension system was established and contribution rates were increased from 17.2 
percent (12.8 percent on the employer and 4.4 percent on the employee) to the 
current rate of 27.5 percent.  Despite these reforms, there is strong evidence that 
the current system of contributions and benefits is unsustainable.  The urgency of 
this imbalance is well-recognized, and its correction will require actions to 
broaden participation in the system and to reduce the program’s benefit cost.  
Reforms could reduce the number of private sector workers who are exempt from 
participating in the social security system, as well as the number of public sector 
workers who are granted “transitional” relief from participating in the system.  
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Reforms could also reduce benefit costs, such as changes in the age at which 
benefits become available and modifications to the benefit formulae. 
 
4. Some Effects of the Payroll Taxes 
This section examines some of the main effects of the payroll taxes, 
focusing especially on the parafiscales. 
 
4.1. The Incidence of the Parafiscales 
As noted above, the parafiscales generate substantial revenues, even if 
these revenues do not contribute to the general revenues of the government.  
Because these revenues must ultimately be paid by someone, the parafiscales have 
a significant impact on the distribution of income.  This subsection analyzes the 
“incidence”, or the distributional effects, of the parafiscales, and attempts to 
answer the basic question: “Who bears the burden of the parafiscales?”  It should 
be emphasized that it is only the incidence of taxes that is considered.  Any 
benefits that may be received by individuals are ignored, in large part because of 
the absence of information on benefits. 
Economists have devoted much attention to the question of tax incidence.  
Although there is wide agreement about the incidence of some taxes, such as 
excise or individual income taxes, the incidence of other taxes remains 
controversial.  Several basic observations on tax incidence should be kept in mind 
in the discussion that follows.  First, only individuals can bear the burden of a tax 
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(or a contribution).  The employer’s share of a payroll tax is clearly not paid by 
legal entity of the firm, but instead must be paid by its stockholders, workers, 
suppliers, or consumers of its product.  Tax incidence attempts to find ways to 
assign the burden of a tax to these individuals.  Second, and relatedly, there is a 
difference between who is legally responsible for paying a tax – its “statutory” 
incidence – and who ultimately bears the true burden of the tax – its “economic” 
incidence.  For example, most recognize that an excise tax on cigarettes collected 
by retail stores is unlikely to be actually borne by the owners of the retail stores.  
Instead, the stores are likely to shift at least some of the tax to consumers.  The 
relevance to the parafiscales is clear: employers who are legally responsible for 
collecting the taxes may not bear the true economic burden of the parafiscales. 
Third, and perhaps most importantly, when a tax is imposed, individuals 
will adjust their behavior to reduce their tax liabilities, and those who are better 
able to adjust their behavior are better able to shift the tax burden to others.  
Workers may reduce their work effort or shift their labor to untaxed sectors to 
reduce their payroll tax burdens, firms may cut back on their hiring to decrease 
their payroll tax liabilities, and so on. 
There are two issues here.  The first is whether the incidence of a tax 
depends upon how the tax is collected, whether from the employer or the 
employee.  It is widely accepted in economics that in competitive markets the 
incidence of a tax does not depend upon where the tax is statutorily levied; that is, 
a tax collected from an employer has the same economic effects as the same rate 
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tax collected from an employee.  However, when markets are not competitive 
because of, for example, monopolistic business practices, employers may be able 
to pass on their share of a tax to consumers. 
The second issue is the incidence of the (combined) tax.  Here the 
conclusion is more unsettled.  One school of thought asserts that labor bears the 
full burden of parafiscales tax rates, so that its after-tax income falls by the full 
amount of the taxes.  Another school holds that labor is able to shift at least some 
of the tax to capital and to consumers.  The crucial issue here is the degree of 
responsiveness of labor to a change in its wage, or its elasticity of labor supply.  If 
labor is fixed in supply to the taxable sectors – or if its supply elasticity is zero – 
then labor will bear the full burden of the parafiscales.  Conversely, the more 
responsive is labor to a wage change, the more will the tax burden be shifted 
elsewhere.9 
Much, though not all, of the empirical work in developed countries 
concludes that labor supply is almost completely inelastic, so the usual 
assumption made is that labor bears the full burden of any payroll tax.  However, 
estimates of the labor supply elasticity in Colombia suggest that labor supply is 
not completely inelastic (Kugler, 2001; Kugler, 2002; Kugler and Kugler, 2002).  
One possible channel of labor supply response is migration.  Of greater 
importance is the fact that only labor in certain sectors of Colombia is taxed: labor 
can escape most of the parafiscales by moving to the untaxed or uncovered 
sectors, such as the informal sector or the self-employed sector.  These avenues of 
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escape suggest that labor may be able to shift some of the parafiscales tax burden 
to other groups, even though the precise magnitude of the shifting is unknown. 
Because of these considerations, the incidence of the parafiscales is 
examined using several different approaches.  In a first, and somewhat informal, 
approach, we make alternative assumptions about the incidence of the 
parafiscales, and examine some suggestive information on the distribution of 
wage income across sectors.  In a second approach, we utilize the computable 
general equilibrium model constructed by Rutherford, Light, and Barrera (2003) 
and calibrated to Colombian data in order to generate more precise estimates of 
the impact of various payroll tax reforms on the distribution of income. 
4.1.1. The Incidence of the Parafiscales by Wage Income and Sector.  
Consider the more informal approach first.  Here we make two alternative 
assumptions about the incidence of the parafiscales.  Under the first assumption, 
labor is assumed to bear the full burden of the parafiscales.  This assumption 
implies that the statutory tax burden is the same as the economic burden; that is, 
there is no shifting of the tax burden from labor.  It is made operational by 
examining the distribution of wage income (and the percent of wages in total 
income) for all workers in Colombia.  The alternative assumption recognizes that 
labor is able to escape the tax by shifting to untaxed sectors and activities.  Under 
this assumption, the incidence of the parafiscales by sectors is examined.  In 
particular, it is assumed that only workers in the formal sector of the Colombian 
economy bear the burden of the payroll taxes, so that the distribution of wage 
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income (and the percent of wages in total income) is examined for workers in the 
formal sector alone. 
Some information on wages in shown in Table 7, as reported by DANE 
for 1998.  In the formal sector, wages as a percent of total income are roughly 
one-third for the lowest and highest decile, and the percent has some tendency to 
decline with total income, at least above the 4th decile.  If one assumes that 
workers in the formal sector bear the burden of the parafiscales in proportion to 
their wage income, then the incidence of the payroll taxes is largely regressive.  
Table 7 also shows by decile the percent of wage income received by formal 
sector workers.  For example, formal sector workers in the first decile receive as 
wages 13.2 percent of total formal and informal sector wage income of the decile; 
similarly, formal sector workers in the top decile receive 64.9 percent of total 
formal and informal sector wage income.  There is a clear tendency for the 
percent of total wage income received by formal sector workers to increase with 
decile.  This implies that the earlier pattern of payroll tax regressivity for formal 
sector workers is somewhat offset for all workers, formal and informal sector; that 
is, if we now assume that workers (or their employers) in the informal sector 
largely do not pay the payroll taxes, and if these workers tend to be concentrated 
in lower income deciles, then the parafiscales will be paid mainly by higher 
income, formal sector workers. 
Note that even the alternative assumption – that only workers in the formal 
sector of the Colombian economy bear the burden of the payroll taxes – does not 
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allow for any shifting of the burden of payroll taxes via adjustments in wages and 
other prices.  The existence of a sector to which resources may move to the 
payroll taxes means that these taxes drive a wedge between the returns to factors 
of production in the different sectors.  For example, if labor is mobile between the 
formal and the informal sectors of the economy, then labor will move between 
these sectors until the net-of-tax return in the formal sector equals the untaxed 
return in the informal sector.10  This movement will affect the wages of labor in 
both sectors, raising wages in the formal sector as labor flows from this sector and 
reducing wages in the informal sector as labor moves into this sector.  Fully 
identifying the impact of this factor movement requires a general equilibrium 
model of the Colombian economy.  It is this approach this is considered next. 
4.1.2. A Computable General Equilibrium Model of Colombia.  
Rutherford, Light, and Barrera (2003) construct a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model of Colombia, using 1997 social accounts, and use this model to 
estimate the welfare costs of alternative tax changes.  This model is used here to 
evaluate the distributional effects of several payroll tax reforms.  In one reform, 
the existing payroll tax rate is increased by 25 percent; in a second reform all 
payroll taxes are replaced with a higher VAT tax rate that generates equal 
revenues.  It should be noted that payroll taxes are viewed in the model as an ad 
valorem price increase on labor inputs to production; in contrast, labor taxes are 
also in the model, and are seen as an ad valorem tax that applies directly to an 
individual’s wage and so reduces household income.  If all sectors paid the same 
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payroll tax rate, then there would be no difference between payroll and labor 
taxes.  However, Colombian social accounts data indicate that sectors do not pay 
the same payroll tax rate.11  See Rutherford, Light, and Barrera (2003) for a 
complete discussion of their model.12 
Table 8 shows the impacts of these tax reforms on household welfare.  An 
increase in payroll tax rates has a progressive impact on the distribution of 
income, reducing the welfare of higher decile groups by a larger percentage than 
its impact on lower decile groups.  This result occurs largely because employment 
in the informal sector is concentrated in lower income groups, so that these 
individuals do not pay much of any increase in payroll tax rates.  This result is 
consistent with our earlier incidence conclusion where it was assumed that only 
workers in the formal sector bear the burden of payroll taxes.  Table 8 also 
indicates that a replacement of payroll taxes with the VAT reduces welfare for all 
groups, but tends to reduce welfare by greater percentages for lower income 
deciles. 
 
4.2. Erosion of Parafiscales Revenues 
It is widely suspected that the existence of the payroll taxes gives an 
incentive for individuals to attempt to escape the payment of taxes.  There are 
several avenues that are available to individuals.  One avenue is to move from the 
formal sector to the untaxed, informal sector of the Colombian economy to escape 
legal payment of the taxes.  Another legal avenue is to change the nature of 
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compensation from taxable forms (e.g., wages) to tax-exempt forms (e.g., 
bonuses, honoraria, fees).  Still another avenue is outright evasion of the legally 
due payroll tax liability.13  Measuring the extent of this erosion via avoidance and 
evasion is obviously quite difficult.14  Attempts to infer the extent of erosion, 
mainly from the movement of employment from the formal to the informal sector, 
are discussed in detail by López-Castaño (2002). 
Some preliminary evidence indicates that the degree of “informality” in 
employment (e.g., for the most part employment in firms with small numbers of 
employees, fewer than 10) is countercyclical (Figure 4); that is, the decline in 
GDP growth rates that occurred in the last half of the 1990s led to an increase in 
employment in the informal sector.  This finding suggests that one cost of the 
growth in informal employment is the loss of importance of the wage-earning 
employment (mainly the one generated by companies of more than 10 workers), 
and the consequent loss in parafiscales tax revenues.  Put differently, workers in 
the formal sector are able to avoid the burden of the parafiscales by shifting 
sectors of employment.  Further evidence of such sector shifts from the 
parafiscales is discussed in the section on reforms. 
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the collection of the parafiscales in 
Colombia.  Measured in units relative to thousands of the monthly minimum 
wage, the real collection of the parafiscales rose considerably between 1995 and 
1998, and then fell through 2000 before rising slightly again in 2001.  This 
behavior reveals the impact of two factors that move in opposite directions:  
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• the base of the tax – the annual national wage-earning payroll – is 
strongly procyclical; 
• the effective rate of taxation – collections relative to the payroll 
base – is countercyclical. 
Recall that the statutory tax rate of the parafiscales is 9 percent.  Consequently, 
one measure of the amount of erosion in the parafiscales is the difference between 
the statutory tax rate of 9 percent and the effective tax rate of Figure 5.  By these 
estimates, erosion in 1995 was 3.6 percentage points (or the 9 percent statutory 
tax rate less the 5.4 percent effective tax rate); in 2001 it was only 2.6 percentage 
points.  Consequently, erosion of the parafiscales was reduced from 40 percent in 
1995 (or 3.6/9) to 29 percent in 2001. 
Indeed, by this measure erosion of the parafiscales does not seem very 
high.   Other estimates are less comforting.  For example, in November 2001 
SENA reported 127,288 contributing companies at the national level, a number 
that represents only  24 percent of the 532,413 companies affiliated in that year 
with the Confecámaras, or the Chambers of Commerce of Colombia.  However, 
the SENA approach is somewhat misleading because 81 percent of the companies 
are micro-firms, which totaled 432,269 according to the Confecámaras.  Such 
firms are unlikely to be liable for the parafiscales taxes, and, even if liable, they 
have a very small amount of the total national payroll. 
Some additional indications of the extent of payroll tax erosion are given 
in Tables 9 and 10, which show the coverage rate (or the fraction of workers 
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affiliated with a social security program) in ten metropolitan areas for health 
(Table 9) and for pensions (Table 10).  For both programs, the coverage rate is 
lower, and the corresponding estimated erosion rate is higher, for workers in small 
firms, for self-employed workers, and for all workers in the informal sector.  For 
example, in 2000 only 38.4 percent of workers in small firms are covered by 
health plans, and only 23.1 percent are in pension plans.  Coverage rates for 
workers in the informal sector are even lower.  It is therefore clear that many 
firms, especially the smaller ones, escape health and pension obligations.  On the 
assumption that these firms similarly escape their parafiscales obligations, erosion 
of the parafiscales is also quite large. 
 
4.3. Sectoral, Occupational, and Employment Effects of the Parafiscales 
In order to quantify the sectoral, occupational, and employment effects of 
the parafiscales at a more disaggregated level than available in the Rutherford, 
Light, and Barrera (2003) model, López-Castaño  (2002) utilizes a different 
formulation of a CGE model of the Colombian economy.  He divides the 
economy into four sectors: farming, urban/informal, urban/unskilled, and 
urban/skilled.  He assumes that the payroll taxes do not have a direct impact on 
either the informal sector (29 percent of the labor force in 1999) or the farming 
sector (22 percent of the labor force); rather the taxes affect only non-farming 
wage earners (skilled and unskilled), or the remaining 49 percent of the 
Colombian labor force.  Labor demands are specified with both fixed coefficients 
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(e.g., government services) and CES production functions.  He calibrates the 
model with data from the 1999 social accounting matrix for Colombia. 
López-Castaño (2002) examines several scenarios:  
1) an increase (for non-farming skilled and unskilled workers) of 2 
percentage points in the parafiscales tax rate, to be used to finance pension 
reforms; 
2) an increase of the parafiscales applied exclusively on skilled workers, 
calculated in such a way as to generate the same revenue as in the previous 
case; 
3) the abolition of the contributions to the Cajas de Compensación (4 
percent), to the SENA (2 percent), and to the ICBF (3 percent), financed 
by an increase in the fiscal deficit; 
4) the abolition of the contributions to the Cajas de Compensación, to the 
SENA, and to the ICBF, financed by an increase in the value-added tax; 
and 
5) the abolition of the contributions to the Cajas de Compensación, to the 
SENA, and to the ICBF, financed by an increase in company income tax. 
He presents estimates of the effects of these reforms on total employment, the 
unemployment rate, GDP, the external sector, and the overall fiscal deficit. 
Perhaps of most interest are the first, third, and fifth scenarios.  In the first 
case (or an increase in the parafiscales tax rate of 2 percentage points), there is a 
loss of 52,000 jobs and a corresponding increase in the national unemployment 
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rate from the benchmark rate of 17.6 percent to 17.9 percent.  The main effects 
are felt in the unskilled labor force, where 33,000 jobs are lost, and in the urban 
labor market, as workers move into the informal sector.  Also, GDP falls slightly 
by 0.5 percent, the volume of imports and exports also falls slightly, and fiscal 
deficit declines from 4.8 percent to 4.7 percent of GDP. 
In contrast, changes in the way that parafiscales are financed (e.g., by 
deficit or by an income tax surcharge) have larger effects, especially on 
employment.  Assuming that savings determine investment, then elimination of 
the 9 percent parafiscales tax rate, with the programs financed by an increase in 
the deficit (from 4.8 percent to 5.9 percent of GDP), increases employment by 
115,000 but has virtually no impact on GDP.  If instead the parafiscales are 
financed by an increase in the company income tax rate from 35 percent to 42.7 
percent, then employment increases by 126,000 and GDP rises by 0.5 percent.  
Even in these cases, however, the overall effects are relatively modest.15 
 
5. Conclusions 
There are several major conclusions from this study.  First, it is clear that 
the parafiscales should properly be seen as a tax, just like other taxes whose 
revenues contribute to the general fund of the government.  In this perspective: 
• the parafiscales tax rates are high; 
• they are distorting, especially between sectors; 
• they are costly and cumbersome to comply with; 
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• they are escaped by legal and illegal avenues, and 
• they raise unemployment. 
Second, the programs financed by the parafiscales – the SENA, the ICBF, and the 
Cajas de Compensación – are: 
• doing some things that are appropriate for government, especially 
given the high levels of unemployment and the delivery of social 
services in Colombia (e.g., the provision of training by the SENA, 
the provision of social and welfare services by the ICBF and the 
Cajas de Compensación); 
• doing some things that are inappropriate for government (e.g., the 
direct competition between the Cajas de Compensación and the 
private sector in the provision of services like recreation and 
sports, travel agencies, theaters, supermarkets, and the like, and the 
ICBF provision of income subsidies financed by a tax that 
discourages employment); 
• doing some things with uncertain efficiency, given the almost 
complete lack of evaluation and the absence of competition (e.g., 
the significantly higher cost of training in SENA than comparable 
training in the private sector); and 
• doing some things with virtually no accountability, given a general 
lack of oversight. 
These findings suggest several avenues of reform of the parafiscales. 
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A first set relates to the programs financed by the taxes, in SENA, ICBF, 
and the Cajas de Compensación: 
• Programs currently financed by the parafiscales should be 
subjected to thorough evaluation. 
• If found to be productive, the programs should be continued, 
conditional upon improving accountability. 
• If found to be unproductive, programs should be eliminated or 
reformed.  
• Accountability of the programs must be improved via greater 
oversight. 
Note that elimination of some programs would allow a general rate reduction of 
the parafiscales tax rates. 
As for the parafiscales themselves, a second set of reforms focuses on the 
taxes: 
• The elimination (or reform) of some programs currently financed 
by the parafiscales would allow a reduction in the parafiscales tax 
rates.  For example, moving some of the training programs 
currently in the SENA to the private sector would likely allow a 
reduction in the parafiscales SENA tax rate from 2 to 1 percent.  
Also, the Cajas de Compensación are currently providing some 
services that are in direct competition with the private sector.  
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Eliminating these programs would likely allow a reduction in the 
parafiscales tax rate for the Cajas from 4 to 2 percent. 
• Consideration should be given for the use of presumptive methods 
of taxation for currently uncovered workers. 
• Consideration should be given to complete elimination of the 9 
percent parafiscales tax rates, with funding for the programs 
currently financed by the 9 percent tax on payrolls replaced by 
general tax funds. 
In addition, broadening the tax base via administrative improvements that 
increase compliance would allow parafiscales tax rates to be reduced. 
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Table 1. Tax and Contribution Rates in Main Payroll Programs 
 
Program 
Rate on 
Employer 
(percent) 
Rate on 
Employee 
(percent) 
 
Total Rate 
(percent) 
 
Individual-
benefit? 
1. Social Security Contributions 
    Health 8.0 4.0 12.0 Yes 
    Pensions 10.125 3.375 13.5 Yes 
    Professional Risks 2.0 0 2.0 Yes 
    Total: Social Security 
Contributions 
20.125 7.375 27.5 --- 
 
2. Parafiscales 
    SENA 2.0 0 2.0 No 
    ICBF 3.0 0 3.0 No 
    Cajas de Compensación 4.0 0 4.0 No 
    Total: Parafiscales 9.0 0 9.0 --- 
 
3. Learning Quota 5.0 0 5.0 No 
 
TOTAL: All Programs 34.125 7.375 41.5 --- 
 
 
Table 2. Tax Rates from Payroll Taxes and Social Security Contributions in 
Latin America Countries 
Country 
Total Tax Rate 
(A) = (B)+(C) 
Payroll Tax Rate 
(Other than SSC) 
(B) 
Total Social 
Security 
Contribution (SSC) 
Rates 
(C) = (D)+(E) 
Social Security 
Charges  
to Employers 
(D) 
Social Security 
Charges  
to Employees 
(E) 
Argentina  38% - 42% 0%  38% - 42% 21% - 25%  17%  
Brasil  19.15% - 22.8% 8.5% 10.75% - 14.3%   3.1% - 3.3%   7.65% - 11%  
Colombia 36.5% 9% 27.50% 20.125% 7.375% 
Costa Rica 32% 0% 32%  23%   9% 
Chile 20.05% - 20.55% 0.05% 20.04% - 20.5%  0.95%  19.09% - 19.55%  
Ecuador 21.5% 1%  20.5% 11.15%  9.35%  
El Salvador 19%  5.5%  13.5%  9.5%  4% 
Guatemala 11.5% - 14.5%  0% 11.5% - 14.5%  9% - 10% 2.5% - 4.5% 
Honduras  15% 1% 14%   7% 3.5%  
Mexico  42.29% - 44.92% 6% - 8% 36.92%  30.19%  6.73%  
Nicaragua 15.25% - 23.5%  2% 13.25% - 21.50%  9% - 15%  4.25% - 6.25%  
Panamá 21.31% - 26.35% 2.75% 18.56% - 23.6%  11.31% - 16.35% 7.25%  
Peru 24.53% - 25.55% 2% 22.53% - 23.55%  9.53% - 10.55%  13% 
Venezuela 24.17% - 27.17% 2.5% - 4.5% 21.67% - 22.67% 15.42% -16.17% 6.25% - 6.5%  
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), various issues.  All 
contributions are computed as a percentage of the employee's salary. 
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Table 3.  Tax Rates from Payroll Taxes and Social Security Contributions in 
OECD Countries 
  
Country 
Total Tax Rate 
(A) = (B)+(C) 
Payroll Tax Rate  
(Other than SSC)  
  (B) 
Total Social 
Security 
Contribution (SSC) 
Rates 
(C) = (D)+(E) 
Social Security 
Charges  
to Employers 
(D) 
Social Security 
Charges  
to Employees 
(E) 
Australia Up to 7% Up to 7% 0% 0%  0%  
Austria  29.15% - 29.3% 7.5% 21.65% - 21.8 21.65% - 21.8 NA  
Belgium 32.89% - 48.66% 0% 32.89% - 48.66 32.89% - 48.66 NA 
Canada % Rate Varies 1% - 4.5% % Rate Varies % Rate Varies NA 
Denmark 0% 0% 0%  0% 0%  
Finland 26.4% - 28.4% 0% 26.4% - 28.4% 20.1% - 22.1% 6.3%  
France  42.25% - 64.63%  4.25% -13.60% 38% - 51.03% 38% - 51.03% NA 
Germany 40.8% 0% 40.8% 20.4% 20.4% 
Greece 43.86% - 54.36% 0% 43.86% - 54.36% 27.96% - 34.96% 15.90% -19.40% 
Ireland 18% 0% 18% 12% 6% 
Italy 36% - 42% 0% 36% - 42% 32% - 36% 4% - 6% 
Mexico  42.92% - 44.92% 6% - 8% 36.92%  30.19%  6.73%  
Netherlands 25.31% 0% 25.31% 18.66% 6.65% 
Norway 26.6% 0% 26.6% 26.6% NA 
Portugal 23.75% 0% 23.75% 23.75% 0% 
Spain 37.15% – 37.2% 0% 37.15% - 37.2% 30.8% 6.35% - 6.4% 
Sweden  81.34% 48.52% 32.82% 32.82% 0% 
Switzerland 13.1% 0% 13.1% 6.55% 6.55% 
Turkey 55.5% - 61% 0% 55.5% - 61% 32.5% - 38% 23% 
United Kingdom 0% - 23.6% 0% 0% - 23.6% 0% - 11.8% 0% - 11.8% 
United States 15.3% 0% 15.3% 7.65% 7.65% 
Source: International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD), various issues.  All 
contributions are computed as a percentage of the employee's salary. 
 
 
Table 4. Some Features of the Parafiscales 
Institution Relevant History and Laws Percent Tax Uses of Revenues 
Cajas de 
Compensación 
• 
• 
In 1957 through Extraordinary Decree 118 the family subsidy 
was established as an obligation for every firm with more 
than 20 employees; it was also established that the Cajas de 
Compensación would be the re-distributors of the 
contributions for this system.  
In 1982 Law 21 dictated that the Cajas de Compensación are 
non-profit entities of private law, organized as corporations 
and under the control and vigilance of the State. 
4% To reduce the 
economic burden of 
the poorest workers, 
through subsidies 
given in money, in 
kind, and in services 
Instituto 
Colombiano de 
Bienestar Familiar 
• Article 53 of Law 75 of 1968 created a decentralized public 
establishment (ICBF) with the aim of providing protection for 
children and improving the welfare of Colombian families.  
3% To provide protection 
for children and to 
improve the welfare of 
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(ICBF, or Institute 
for Colombian 
Family Welfare) 
• 
• 
For financing this Institute, Law 27 of 1974 created a 2% 
contribution on monthly payroll of private and public entities.  
Law 89 of 1988 increased this contribution to 3% of the 
monthly payroll, a rate that is currently in force. 
the Colombian 
families 
Servicio Nacional 
de Aprendizaje 
(SENA, or National 
Training Service) 
• 
• 
SENA is a public establishment attached to the Ministerio de 
Trabajo (Ministry of Work).  
To finance SENA, Decree 1042 of 1978 and Law 21 of 1982 
established a 2% contribution on the monthly payroll of the 
productive sector and of 0.5% for the public sector. 
2% for the 
productive 
sector  
0.5% for the 
public sector
To invest in social and 
technical development 
of the workers through 
programs of integral 
professional formation
 
 
Table 5. Distribution of Cajas de Compensación Contributions, 2000 
 
Uses 
Thousands of 
Pesos 
Percent of Total 
Contributions 
Points of 4% 
Parafiscales Tax Rate
Social Housing 161,219,392 14.1% 0.56 
Health 79,780,556 7.0 0.28 
Fund Management 109,820,747 9.6 0.38 
Legal Reserve 1,772,636 0.2 0.01 
Payment to Superintendencia 89,862,265 7.9 0.31 
Education 31,527,832 2.8 0.11 
Social Services 283,750,486 24.8 0.99 
Monetary Subsidy 385,340,167 33.7 1.35 
 
TOTAL 1,143,074,081 100.0% 4% 
Source: Superintendencia de Subsidio Familiar. 
 
 
Table 6. Percent of Urban Workers Receiving Family Subsidies, 1997 
 
 
Workers 
Workers with Some 
Right to Family 
Subsidies 
 
 
For Workers Receiving Family 
Subsidies 
Distribution between 
Nonsalaried and 
Salaried Workers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Decile 
 
Average 
Monthly 
Income 
(in Legal 
Minimum 
Wages) 
 
 
 
Total 
Number 
of 
Workers 
 
Nonsalaried 
Workers 
(percent) 
 
Salaried 
Workers 
(percent)
 
 
 
 
Nonsalaried 
Workers 
(percent) 
 
 
 
 
Salaried 
Workers 
(percent)
 
 
Nonsalarie
d Workers 
Receiving 
Subsidies 
(percent) 
 
 
Salaried 
Workers 
Receiving 
Subsidies 
(percent) 
 
Distribution 
of Total 
Monthly 
Subsidy 
Amount 
(percent) 
1 0.01 518,440 99.2% 0.8% 0.5% 58.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
2 0.48 525,158 73.1 26.9 2.8 10.3 0.8 3.1 0.7 
3 0.95 522,730 49.4 50.6 13.3 26.3 2.4 4.7 1.0 
4 1.25 522,381 33.4 66.6 45.4 68.2 13.0 19.5 7.1 
5 1.56 521,379 43.5 56.5 38.3 67.9 14.0 24.8 9.2 
6 1.90 522,728 50.5 49.5 36.8 74.4 18.7 37.8 11.5 
7 2.49 521,341 39.7 60.3 49.9 82.8 25.9 42.9 15.6 
8 3.37 520,230 38.0 62.0 52.9 85.3 30.6 49.4 20.6 
9 5.05 524,843 40.1 59.9 55.7 92.9 21.7 36.2 23.8 
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10 15.42 522,889 33.9 66.1 62.7 94.8 10.4 15.7 10.6 
TOTAL 3.25 5,222,119 50.0 50.0 35.8 71.7 13.7 27.5 100.0 
Source: Quality of Life Survey (1997).  Salaried workers include workers in the 
public and private sectors, and nonsalaried workers include the self-employed, 
domestic servants, and employers.  
 
Table 7. Wage and Total Income by Formal and Informal Sector, 1998 
Formal Sector Workers Only  
Income 
Decile 
Wage Income 
(in millions of 
pesos) 
Total Income 
(in millions of 
pesos) 
Wage Income 
as Percent of 
Total Income 
Percent of Total Formal 
and Informal Sector Wage 
Income Received by Formal 
Sector Workers 
1 20,487 60,764 33.7% 13.2% 
2 129,260 223,994 57.7 27.4 
3 174,680 304,551 57.4 30.3 
4 241,862 402,653 60.1 36.7 
5 282,915 489,758 57.8 39.1 
6 324,009 616,253 52.6 44.9 
7 407,923 790,377 51.6 49.4 
8 490,931 977,198 50.2 48.9 
9 693,285 1,496,482 46.3 59.1 
10 1,303,002 3,716,949 35.1 64.9 
TOTAL 4,068,354 9,078,979 44.8 41.4 
Source: DANE. 
 
Table 8. Some Effects of Payroll Tax Reform in a CGE Model 
Impact on Household Welfare  
 
 
Household Welfare 
Decile 
25 Percent Payroll 
Tax Increase 
(as percent of 
welfare) 
Replacement of 
Payroll Taxes with 
VAT 
(as percent of welfare)
1 -12% -30% 
2 -16 -19 
3 -18 -11 
4 -18 -13 
5 -20 -8 
6 -18 -17 
7 -20 -13 
8 -21 -15 
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9 -21 -12 
10 -26 -8 
Source: Computations from Rutherford, Light, and Barrera (2003). 
 
 
Table 9. Health Social Security Coverage in 10 Metropolitan Areas, 1994-
2000 
 
Health Coverage Rate 
Estimated Erosion Rate, 
2000 
 
 
Distribution of Employment 
By Fraction of Employment By Fraction of Payroll 
 
 
Type of Employment 
1994 1996 1998 2000 1994 1996 1998 2000 1994 1996 1998 2000 
By 
Employment
By 
Payroll 
A. Wage Earners 0.631 0.636 0.594 0.542 0.705 0.710 0.726 0.698 0.799 0.807 0.828 0.803 0.302 0.197 
1. Small Firms 0.200 0.205 0.192 0.188 0.417 0.420 0.443 0.384 0.495 0.478 0.560 0.434 0.616 0.566 
2. Medium/Large Firms 0.346 0.348 0.315 0.283 0.809 0.825 0.838 0.845 0.858 0.876 0.876 0.890 0.155 0.110 
3. Government 0.086 0.083 0.087 0.070 0.958 0.944 0.943 0.951 0.973 0.963 0.955 0.973 0.049 0.027 
 
B. Independent 0.309 0.313 0.341 0.385 0.183 0.271 0.204 0.210 0.443 0.541 0.420 0.467 0.790 0.533 
1. Self-employed 0.238 0.255 0.277 0.326 0.135 0.226 0.155 0.159 0.253 0.363 0.282 0.305 0.841 0.695 
a. Informal 0.217 0.236 0.253 0.300 0.114 0.203 0.137 0.142 0.179 0.285 0.219 0.260 0.858 0.740 
b. Professional/Technical 0.020 0.019 0.024 0.026 0.358 0.500 0.344 0.365 0.455 0.659 0.456 0.492 0.635 0.508 
2. Patrons 0.071 0.058 0.065 0.059 0.344 0.470 0.413 0.491 0.638 0.762 0.613 0.699 0.509 0.301 
a. Small Firms 0.062 0.051 0.057 0.052 0.292 0.425 0.377 0.458 0.495 0.643 0.523 0.659 0.542 0.341 
b. Medium/Large Firms 0.010 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.676 0.783 0.678 0.739 0.886 0.949 0.835 0.833 0.261 0.167 
 
C. Other Employment 0.056 0.047 0.060 0.068 0.198 0.254 0.268 0.258 0.267 0.344 0.391 0.406 0.742 0.594 
 
TOTAL 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.513 0.549 0.517 0.477 0.631 0.697 0.675 0.675 0.523 0.325 
1. Formal Sector 0.461 0.458 0.433 0.386 0.814 0.832 0.829 0.831 0.846 0.887 0.854 0.877 0.169 0.123 
2. Informal Sector 0.535 0.539 0.562 0.609 0.257 0.311 0.280 0.257 0.373 0.437 0.415 0.425 0.743 0.575 
3. Did Not Report 0.004 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.036 0.033 0.055 0.044 0.016 0.038 0.127 0.068 0.956 0.932 
Source: DANE, Quarterly Household Survey (June).  Question 25A in the survey 
asks “Because of your work, are you affiliated with a health social security 
entity?” with alternative answers yes, no, does not know, or does not report.  
Using this question, the health system’s coverage rate is estimated by the percent 
of workers covered by the health system and by the percent of payroll covered by 
the health system; the latter is calculated by dividing the covered payroll (or 
covered employment times the average wage of covered employees) by the total 
payroll (or total employment times total average wage). 
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Table 10. Pension Social Security Coverage in 10 Metropolitan Areas, 1996-
2000 
Pension Coverage Rate Estimated Erosion Rate, 2000 
By Fraction of Employment By Fraction of Payroll 
 
 
Type of Employment 1996 1998 2000 1996 1998 2000 
By 
Employment 
By 
Payroll 
A. Wage Earners 0.533 0.594 0.566 0.655 0.733 0.700 0.434 0.300 
1. Small Firms 0.251 0.280 0.231 0.284 0.405 0.286 0.769 0.714 
2. Medium/Large Firms 0.633 0.706 0.715 0.720 0.780 0.788 0.285 0.212 
3. Government 0.803 0.874 0.868 0.861 0.917 0.913 0.132 0.087 
 
B. Independent 0.135 0.122 0.102 0.267 0.285 0.298 0.898 0.702 
1. Self-employed 0.102 0.090 0.068 0.185 0.169 0.162 0.932 0.838 
a. Informal 0.085 0.076 0.055 0.142 0.118 0.131 0.945 0.869 
b. Professional/Technical 0.308 0.240 0.224 0.356 0.327 0.297 0.776 0.703 
2. Patrons 0.279 0.261 0.289 0.371 0.448 0.494 0.711 0.506 
a. Small Firms 0.242 0.217 0.246 0.401 0.336 0.444 0.754 0.556 
b. Medium/Large Firms 0.526 0.585 0.620 0.288 0.723 0.654 0.380 0.346 
 
C. Other Employment 0.101 0.139 0.121 0.132 0.219 0.192 0.879 0.808 
 
TOTAL 0.385 0.401 0.351 0.501 0.564 0.547 0.649 0.453 
1. Formal Sector 0.649 0.712 0.709 0.669 0.767 0.776 0.291 0.224 
2. Informal Sector 0.164 0.166 0.132 0.250 0.270 0.262 0.868 0.738 
3. Did Not Report 0.033 0.016 0.005 0.038 0.004 0.005 0.995 0.995 
Source: DANE, Quarterly Household Survey (June).  Question 25B in the June 
survey asks “Because of your work, are you affiliated with a pension social 
security entity?” with alternative answers yes, no, does not know, or does not 
report.  Using this question, the pension system’s coverage rate is estimated by 
the percent of workers covered by the pension system and by the percent of 
payroll covered by the pension system; the latter is calculated by dividing the 
covered payroll (or covered employment times the average wage of covered 
employees) by the total payroll (or total employment times total average wage). 
 
 
Figure 1. Urban, Rural, and National Unemployment Rates, 1984-2001 
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Source: DANE. 
 
 
Figure 2. Urban, Rural, and National Labor Force Participation Rates, 1984-
2002 
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Figure 3. Index of Minimum, Qualified, and Total Real Wages for Seven 
Main Cities, 1991-1999a 
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Source: DANE, Surveys of Homes. The wages are the average labor income in 
the seven main cities. The qualified wage corresponds to people with superior 
education (completed or incompleted).   All series are deflated by the consumer 
price index with base March 1991=100. 
 
Figure 4. Growth of GDP versus Growth of “Informality” in Seven Main 
Cities, 1992-2000 
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Figure 5. Effective Tax Rate and Indices of Total Parafiscales Collections and 
Payroll Base 
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SSources: For the Collection Index, SENA, ICBF, Ministry of Work and Health, 
Supersubsidy, and “Asofondos”; for the Payroll Index, DANE and National 
Surveys of Homes (September).  The Collection Index (Base 1995=100) is 
constructed expressing the collection in thousands of minimum wages.  The 
Payroll Index (Base 1995=100) is estimated by multiplying the wage-earning 
employment (for urban areas, workers and government employees; for rural areas, 
working-day laborers and government employees) by the monthly average wage 
of each category and by 12 months.  The Effective Rate of Collection of the 
parafiscales equals the Collection Index divided by the Payroll Index. 
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Endnotes 
                                                          
1  There are also some additional programs in which taxes are withheld from 
individual wages and are then returned to the individual, either at some point during 
the year or at the request of the individual.  A form of unemployment insurance (or 
Cesantias) is financed via an effective tax rate of 10.31 percent on the wages of the 
worker; the amount withheld is returned to the worker upon request, and can be used 
to finance, say, expenditures on housing and education.  Also, the Prima de 
Vacasiones is an allowance for vacations that is withheld as 6.7 percent of wages, and 
the Prima Legal is a charge of 8.9 percent of wages that is paid back to the individual 
in June and again in December.  Because these programs have individual benefits 
paid for by individual contributions, they are not considered here a true tax, and are 
not discussed further.  Social security contributions also generate individually-linked 
benefits. 
2  For a detailed discussion of economic trends during the 1990s, including those in 
the labor market, see Arango and Posada (2001), International Monetary Fund (2001), 
Kugler and Kugler (2001), and Cardenas and Bernal (2002). 
3  Note that a high incidence of unemployment among low skill workers suggests that 
training programs could well have a high return. 
4  Recall also that there are several additional taxes on payroll that generate individual 
benefits (e.g., Cesantias, Prima de Vacaciones, and Prima Legal).  The total additional 
payroll rate from these programs is 25.9 percent. 
 4
                                                                                                                                                              
5  For example, a fund whose cuociente exceeds 110 percent must allocate 27 percent 
of its contributions to social housing, 10 percent to health, 10 percent to fund 
management, 3 percent to a legal reserve, 1 percent to the Superintendencia, and the 
remaining 49 percent to the monetary subsidy and to other services. 
6  Public universities are exempt from the tax.  Also, payments from government 
organizations must be distributed as: 25 per cent to SENA, 25 per cent to the Superior 
School of Public Administration, and 50 per cent for industrial schools and technical 
institutes. 
7  SENA’s National Board of Directors determines the specific jobs within a 
company, regulates each company’s quota, and pre-selects the apprentices (with final 
approval by the company).  The Board also has sanctioning power.  Employers that 
do not fulfill their trainee quota are subject to monthly fines equivalent to 75 or 80 
percent of the monthly legal minimum wage for each trainee not hired. 
8  There are also some special programs, such as those for the armed forces and for 
ECOPETROL. 
9 A further complicating issue is that the payroll taxes apply to workers making the 
legal minimum wage.  Because the minimum wage is fixed and binding, the 
imposition of the payroll taxes on employers will result in an increase in the wage by 
the amount of the taxes and a corresponding reduction in employment; the 
employment impact will depend upon the elasticity of demand.  See López-Castaño 
(2002) for a complete analysis of this and other cases. 
 5
                                                                                                                                                              
10 Note also that the movement of labor from the formal to the informal sector 
generates an inefficient resource allocation.  Although the net-of-tax return to labor is 
equalized across the two sectors, it is the gross-of-tax return to labor in the formal 
sector that measures the social productivity to labor, and this gross-of-tax is higher in 
the formal sector by the amount of the tax.  The tax therefore encourages 
overallocation of resources to untaxed activities and so generates an inefficiency, or 
excess burden. 
11 For example, the coal industry pays payroll taxes at an average rate of 5.9 percent 
of total labor costs and the oil industry pays 6.9 percent.  Average tax rates in some 
other sectors are 10.6 percent (fibers), 9.5 percent (furniture), and 12.6 percent 
(communications).  Most average tax rates lie in the 4 to 6 percent range.  Labor taxes 
are in the 3 to 4 percent range. 
12 We are very grateful to Miles Light for making these additional calculations. 
13 See Bird (1992) for an analysis of the impact of labor taxes on employment in the 
formal and informal sectors. 
14 See Alm, Bahl, and Murray (1991) for an attempt at measuring tax base erosion via 
legal and illegal means in the Jamaican individual income tax. 
15 See López-Castaño (2002) for further discussion of these cases. 
